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Ain’t No Taxing High Enough: Using Land
Value Taxation to Combat the Nation’s
Rental Affordability Crisis
Robert Stephen Earnest†
Introduction
Across the United States, cities are losing affordable rental
housing1 at an alarming rate.2 In some of the nation’s fastestgrowing areas, rental rates have soared, while rental vacancies
have reached a historic low.3 At the same time, housing prices are
rising nearly twice as fast as inflation and wage growth, keeping
homeownership out of reach for many renters.4 As a result, a large
and growing number of renters across the country are denied a
stable place to live, which research consistently demonstrates is
essential for creating safe and healthy communities.5 However, not
all renters are affected equally; the effects of rising rental rates are
disproportionately felt by low-income earners.6 Indeed, a renter
†. J.D. Candidate, 2021, University of Minnesota Law School. I extend my most
sincere gratitude to Professor Ann Burkhart for her advice and guidance throughout
the drafting of this Note; to Professor Robert Salvino for introducing me to urban
economics, planning, and development; to the members of the Minnesota Journal of
Law and Inequality for their diligent editing and insightful feedback; to my family
for their constant love and support during these past twenty-six years of my life; and
to my incredible wife, Rachael, without whom I would not have survived law school.
1. It is widely accepted that for housing to be “affordable,” housing costs should
not exceed 30% of household income. For an overview of the 30% of income standard,
see CHRISTOPHER HERBERT, ALEXANDER HERMANN & DANIEL MCCUE, JOINT CTR.
FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., MEASURING HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: ASSESSING
THE 30 PERCENT OF INCOME STANDARD 2–4 (2018).
2. See STEVE GUGGENMOS & KEVIN BURKE, FREDDIE MAC MULTIFAMILY RES.
CTR., DIMINISHING AFFORDABILITY – INESCAPABLE: QUANTIFYING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN POPULATION GROWTH AND MULTIFAMILY RENTAL AFFORDABILITY 2 (2019)
(finding that nearly 86% of metro areas saw a reduction in affordable housing
between 2010 and 2017).
3. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S
HOUSING 2019, at 1–4 (Marcia Fernald ed., 2019) [hereinafter STATE OF THE
NATION’S HOUSING 2019].
4. See id. at 4.
5. See, e.g., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., WHERE WE LIVE MATTERS FOR
OUR HEALTH: THE LINKS BETWEEN HOUSING AND HEALTH 5 (2008) (discussing the
relationship between affordable housing and health).
6. Low-income is defined as earning 80% or less of the median income for a
given metro area (AMI). Income Limits, URB. HOMESTEADING ASSISTANCE BD.,
https://uhab.org/resource/2020-income-limits/ [perma.cc/THE7-4JBY].
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working full-time and earning a minimum wage cannot afford a
two-bedroom apartment—let alone a single-family home—in any
one of the nation’s more than three thousand counties. 7 But lowincome earners are not alone in experiencing rental housing
affordability issues: middle-income earners8 are increasingly
finding themselves priced out of communities as well.9
Not only does rental affordability affect individuals differently
based on income, but it also varies across cities, suburbs, small
towns, and rural areas. For instance, over the past decade, thriving
urban centers like Austin, San Francisco, and Minneapolis-Saint
Paul have struggled to add enough affordable units for low- and
middle-income renter households to keep pace with demand, 10 while
New Orleans lost almost two-hundred such units between
September 2018 and August 2019. 11 However, this is not to say that
rural areas are unaffected by the affordable rental housing crisis:
roughly one quarter of the nation’s most rural areas have seen a
significant increase in the percentage of residents sending more
than half of their income to their landlords.12
The number of households and regions affected by rising rental
rates, combined with the detrimental impact of high housing prices

7. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2 (2019).
8. Middle-income is understood as earning above 120% of AMI. Income Limits,
supra note 6.
9. JENNY SCHUETZ, COST, CROWDING, OR COMMUTING? HOUSING STRESS ON THE
MIDDLE CLASS, BROOKINGS I NST. (May 7, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/cost-crowding-or-commuting-housing-stress-on-the-middle-class/
[perma.cc/2LKK-TUES].
10. In Austin, cost-burden rates for low- and middle-income renter households
increased from 9% in 2000 to 25% in 2015. CARL HEDMAN, DIANA ELLIOTT, TANAYA
SRINI & SHIVA KOORAGAYALA, URB. INST., AUSTIN AND THE STATE OF LOW- AND
MIDDLE-INCOME HOUSING 18 (2017). Since 2010, San Francisco has seen a combined
31% decrease in housing for low- and middle-income earners. Ida Mojadad,
Affordable Housing Lags Far Behind High-Income Housing, Report Shows, SF
WEEKLY (Oct. 17, 2019), https://sfweekly.com/news/affordable-housing-jobs-link/
[perma.cc/WD2L-Y8PH]. Furthermore, between 2011 and 2017, the MinneapolisSaint Paul metro area added only 9,000 new affordable units, which is well below
the 52,570 units that were demanded. METRO. C OUNCIL, AT A LOSS: AFFORDABLE
HOUSING PRODUCTION IN 2017 3 (2019).
11. James Brasuell, Affordable Housing Losing Ground in New Orleans,
PLANETIZEN (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.planetizen.com/news/2019/10/106468affordable-housing-losing-ground-new-orleans [perma.cc/WD45-4APL].
12. Patrick Sisson, The Rent’s ‘Too Damn High’ in Rural America, Too, CURBED
(Apr. 2, 2019), https://archive.curbed.com/2019/4/2/18291233/rent-apartment-ruralaffordable-housing [perma.cc/7XCL-SVZ7].
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on homelessness,13 health outcomes,14 and income inequality,15
have sparked a nationwide conversation about the affordable
housing crisis and have prompted government intervention. At the
federal level, lawmakers have proposed a host of reforms, including
modifications to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)
program16 and increased investment in the federal Housing Trust
Fund.17 State and municipal governments have also taken action to
make housing more affordable. For example, in 2019, the City of
Minneapolis amended its zoning ordinance to allow duplexes and
triplexes on lots previously zoned exclusively for single-family use.18
Oregon followed suit by prohibiting single-family zoning in cities
with populations of 25,000 or more.19 Similarly, the City of Dallas
created an accessory dwelling unit overlay district making it legal
for homeowners to rent out small units built on their property,20
while San Diego County has taken steps to streamline its building
permitting process, thereby increasing the rate at which new rental

13. KATHLEEN MCCORMICK, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, HOUSING THE
HOMELESS 21 (2018) (“The main reason people become homeless today . . . is because
they cannot find housing they can afford.”).
14. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., supra note 5, at 5.
15. See Matthew Rognlie, Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net Capital Share:
Accumulation or Scarcity?, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Spring 2015, at
1, 51 (finding that rising housing costs negatively affect the distribution of income).
16. The LIHTC incentivizes property owners to construct affordable rental units
for low- and middle-income tenants by reducing the tax burden on the property
subject to the credit. JILL KHADDURI, CARISSA CLIMACO & KIMBERLY BURNETT, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., WHAT HAPPENS TO LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT
PROPERTIES AT YEAR 15 AND BEYOND? 1 (2012). Under current law, the value of
LIHTC properties is set at a below-market rate for thirty years. Id. at 6–7. However,
in some cases, owners can pursue a qualified contract option, which allows them to
convert the units to market rate after fifteen years. Id. at 7. The Save Affordable
Housing Act (SAHA) would repeal the qualified contract option. See Senators Young
and Wyden Introduce Legislation to Protect Affordable Housing, U.S. SENATOR TODD
YOUNG OF INDIANA (June 25, 2019), https://www.young.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/senators-young-and-wyden-introduce-legislation-to-protect-affordablehousing [perma.cc/UM8A-L24K] (discussing the SAHA).
17. See, e.g., Diana Budds, Elizabeth Warren Doubles Down on Affordable
Housing Legislation, CURBED (Dec. 11, 2018), https://archive.curbed.com/
2018/12/11/18136027/elizabeth-warren-affordable-housing-bill
[perma.cc/6QUNGNWS] (discussing a bill that would allot an additional $450 billion to the federal
Housing Trust Fund, which is used to develop new affordable rental units).
18. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 521.10(1) (2020). For a general discussion of
the Minneapolis zoning reform, which was the first of its kind in the nation, see Erick
Trickey, How Minneapolis Freed Itself from the Stranglehold of Single-Family
Homes, POLITICO (July 11, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2019/07/11/housing-crisis-single-family-homes-policy-227265
[perma.cc/3H89D5EL].
19. OR. REV. STAT. § 197.758 (2019).
20. DALLAS, TEX., CODE § 51A-4.510 (2018).
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housing is built.21 Underlying these reforms is the intuitive
principle that more housing means lower housing costs. Ultimately,
however, even though these reforms may be necessary to bolster
new housing development, they may not be sufficient.22
What may be sufficient is a centuries-old tax idea known as
land value taxation, which municipal governments have used
recently as a means to raise revenue without increasing taxes for
homeowners.23 Land value taxation, briefly, is a tax regime that
assesses higher tax rates on land values than on building values.
What makes it attractive in the affordable housing context is its
ability to incentivize housing development and, thus, lead to higher
levels of housing construction.24 Of course, the goal of this Note is
not to suggest that land value taxation is a panacea for our nation’s
affordable housing woes, but rather to introduce it as a tool worthy
of serious consideration. To demonstrate this claim, this Note
begins by briefly discussing the recent origins and impacts of the
widening gap between supply of—and demand for—affordable
rental housing. Part I concludes that one of the main drivers of high
housing costs is a shortage of supply and argues that the single-rate
property tax system is partly responsible for this supply shortage.
Part II posits land value taxation as an alternative to this system.
Part III.A argues that land value taxation can augment federal,
state, and local efforts to produce more affordable housing. Part
III.B addresses how three potentially adverse consequences of
enacting a land value tax could be mitigated.

21. Charles T. Clark, County Looks to Streamline Permit Process to Bolster
Housing, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (July 24, 2019), https://www.sandiego
uniontribune.com/news/politics/story/2019-07-24/county-to-look-bolstering-housingby-streamlining-discretionary-permit-process [perma.cc/NCT7-HZRD].
22. For example, recent evidence shows that “upzoning”—the practice of
changing a zoning code to allow for taller and/or denser construction—may not be as
effective at encouraging development as its proponents argue. See Yonah Freemark,
Upzoning Chicago: Impacts of a Zoning Reform on Property Values and Housing
Construction, 56 URB. AFF. REV. 759, 783 (2020) (finding that upzoning had no effect
on housing supply).
23. The tax was most recently enacted in Millbourne, Pennsylvania, to striking
effect: two of the city’s largest parcels, formerly unused, have since come under
development, while homeowners have seen their property tax bills slashed by nearly
a third. J. Brian Charles, Leaning on the Land, GOVERNING (Sept. 2019),
https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-land-tax.html
[perma.cc/3N5EXDKY].
24. See infra Part II.A; Mason Gaffney, Tax Reform to Release Land, in LANDVALUE TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC FINANCE, 75–
76 (Kenneth C. Wenzer ed., 1999) (demonstrating that the single-rate property tax
stands as a formidable obstacle to new housing construction).
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I. Why Has Rental Housing Become So Unaffordable?
While the current affordable rental housing crisis is one of the
worst in recent memory, “[t]he mismatch between the number of
people needing homes and the amount of affordable housing
available [is not] unique to this moment in history . . . .”25 In fact, to
some degree, the United States rental market has always struggled
to supply housing at affordable rates.26 However, commentators and
scholars generally agree that the current affordability crisis began
when the subprime mortgage crisis hit in 2007, resulting in nearly
three million homeowners losing their homes to foreclosure. 27 These
former owner-occupants flocked to an already-crowded rental
market, exacerbating the problems caused by a shortage of
affordable rental housing.28 This, in turn, caused the number of
cost-burdened renter households—those who spend at least 30
percent of their monthly income on rent—to drastically increase, as
former homeowners competed with lower-income renters for
affordable units.29 Indeed, in 2016, nearly half of renters were costburdened compared to 20 percent in 1960.30 While the overall
number and percentage of cost-burdened households has
marginally decreased since the foreclosure crisis of the late 2000s,
homeowners have accounted for much of this reduction. 31 Yet this
does not mean that homeownership has become less expensive:
overall burden rates have dropped primarily because homeowners
have either refinanced into lower-cost mortgages, benefited from
income growth, or left homeownership altogether. 32 Moreover, due
to today’s tighter mortgage underwriting practices, 33 exchanging
25. Bryce Covert, The Deep, Uniquely American Roots of Our Affordable-Housing
Crisis, THE NATION (May 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/give-usshelter/ [perma.cc/6BBZ-7MTM].
26. See id. (chronicling the history of affordable housing in the United States).
27. Id.; see also Gregg Colburn & Ryan Allen, Rent Burden and the Great
Recession in the USA, 55 URB. STUD. 226, 241 (2018) (finding that “rent burden has
unambiguously increased post-recession”).
28. Covert, supra note 25.
29. Id.
30. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 31. Moreover, “[t]he
share of renter households that were severely rent burdened—spending 50 percent
or more of monthly income on rent—increased by 42 percent between 2001 and 2015,
to 17 percent.” PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AMERICAN FAMILIES FACE A GROWING
RENT BURDEN 4 (2018) (emphasis added).
31. In 2017, “[t]he number of cost-burdened owners stood at 17.3 million[,]” or
22.5%. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 31.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 3. For example, the Federal Housing Administration, which insures
mortgages for riskier borrowers, has adopted a rule that will subject roughly 40,000
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monthly rent for a monthly mortgage payment is not an option for
a substantial majority of tenants, and thus their housing options
largely remain limited to apartment buildings. 34 As a result, “costburdened renters now outnumber cost-burdened homeowners by
more than 3 million.”35
At the same time, for a variety of reasons, the United States’
large renter population continues to grow larger.36 Between 2006
and 2016, in roughly a quarter of the nation’s one hundred largest
cities, the population changed from homeowner- to rentermajority.37 During the same time, eleven of the largest cities in the
United States saw double-digit growth in the number of renters,
while seven of those cities saw renter growth exceeding 20
percent.38 Renter growth has also accelerated in mid-sized cities
like Denver, Nashville, and Charlotte, which are among the fastestgrowing rental markets in the nation. 39 Unsurprisingly, the
increased demand for rental housing has caused rental markets to
tighten even further, leading to historically low vacancy rates and

to 50,000 loans per year to manual review. Under the previous rule, those loans
would have been approved automatically. Paul Davidson, Fewer First-Time Home
Buyers Likely to Qualify for Mortgages Under Tougher FHA Standards, USA TODAY
(Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/03/25/home-loansfewer-first-timers-get-mortgages-under-tough-standards/3271050002/
[perma.cc/AF98-6WGL].
34. Manufactured homes—also called mobile homes—have been, and continue to
be, a popular, low-cost option for individuals who cannot afford or do not desire to
purchase site-built homes. See Ann M. Burkhart, Bringing Manufactured Housing
into the Real Estate Finance System, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 428 (2010) (observing that
“[u]p to two-thirds of the new affordable homes built each year have been
manufactured”). However, there are currently multiple factors that make
manufactured housing a less viable alternative to rental housing. See id. at 441–42
(discussing how the legal characterization of manufactured homes as personal
property in a majority of states has led to reduced credit availability for
manufactured home purchases). See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, Zoning Barriers
to Manufactured Housing, 48 URB. LAW. 233 (2016) (discussing the land use
obstacles to manufactured housing construction).
35. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 4.
36. See id. at 3 (“[E]stimates [of renter households] show[ed] an uptick in early
2019, in keeping with Joint Center projections of about 400,000 net new renter
households annually over the coming decade.”).
37. Balazs Szekely, Renters Became the Majority Population in 22 Big US Cities,
RENTCAFE (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.rentcafe.com/blog/rental-market/marketsnapshots/change-renter-vs-owner-population-2006-2016/ [perma.cc/BY69-CR7H].
38. INGRID GOULD ELLEN & BRIAN KARFUNKEL, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR. & CAPITAL
ONE, RENTING IN AMERICA’S LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREAS 12 (2016).
39. Diana Olick, High Rents Trickle Down to Smaller Cities, CNBC (Feb. 20,
2015),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/19/high-rents-trickle-down-to-smallercities.html [perma.cc/5FRH-AGMV].
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higher rents.40 According to the U.S. Census Bureau’s Housing
Vacancy Survey, the national vacancy rate for rental units in early
2019 was 6.9 percent, the lowest it has been since 1986, 41 while
“overall rents [have risen] at . . . twice the pace of overall
inflation.”42
However, unlike previous trends, large cities like Atlanta and
Phoenix are generally not the areas experiencing the most drastic
rent increases; smaller cities like Madison, Alabama and Maryland
Heights, Missouri have seen their rental rates increase by between
6 and 7 percent each year.43 And even though it tends to be the case
that individuals living in cities with higher costs of living tend to
have higher incomes,44 a majority of rental units in United States
metro areas continue to remain unaffordable to the average metro
renter.45
Demand has certainly contributed to growing rental housing
unaffordability, as changing household formation, steady job
growth, and progressively lower turnover rates combine to drive
rental rates upwards.46 Rising home prices also play an important
role by deterring potential homebuyers from entering the housing
market.47 Yet research shows that if this increased demand had
been matched by increased housing construction, rental rates would
generally be much lower than they currently are.48 However, even
40. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 27. Rent growth for
multifamily apartments in 150 metro areas increased from 2.6% in the first quarter
of 2018 to 3.3% in the first quarter of 2019. Id. Furthermore, rent growth for singlefamily units increased from 2.7% in the first quarter of 2018 to 3.2% in January 2019.
Id.
41. Id. at 38. In some places, such as the Minneapolis-Saint Paul metro area,
rental vacancy rates are as low as 2 percent. Jim Buchta, Low Vacancy Rates Make
It Tough for Twin Cities Apartment Renters, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2019),
https://www.startribune.com/low-vacancy-rates-make-it-tough-for-twin-citiesapartment-renters/558031542/ [perma.cc/K8RL-Y3GC].
42. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 4.
43. See Chris Salviati, November 2019 Rent Report, APARTMENT LIST (Oct. 29,
2019),
https://www.apartmentlist.com/rentonomics/november-2019-rent-report/
[perma.cc/TU5U-ND4Q] (city data available in table of recent rent estimates).
44. GOULD ELLEN & KARFUNKEL, supra note 38, at 15, 18.
45. Id. at 18.
46. Olick, supra note 39.
47. Laura Kusisto, More Renters Giving Up on Buying a Home, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
3, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-renters-give-up-on-buying-a-home1522773685 [perma.cc/L8FE-8SFQ].
48. See, e.g., MAC TAYLOR, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., CALIFORNIA’S HIGH
HOUSING COSTS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 12 (2015) (“[O]ur analysis suggests
that . . . if a county with a home building rate in the bottom fifth of all counties
during the 2000s had instead been among the top fifth, its median home prices in

488

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 39: 2

though the stock of new housing has been slowly but steadily
increasing,49 demand has continued to outpace supply in all but
three markets across the United States.50 Thus, the current
affordable rental housing crisis is largely a consequence of there
simply not being enough units available for the renters who seek
them.51
Multiple factors help to explain this supply problem. Labor
shortages in the residential construction sector, for instance, have
both increased the price of labor and prolonged development
schedules, making construction more costly and more timeconsuming.52 Hefty development fees also impose onerous burdens
on housing production.53 Indeed, one study found that development
fees for multifamily housing complexes in Fremont, California
totaled nearly $75,000 per unit.54 Likewise, land use regulations,
such as building codes and zoning ordinances, prevent units from
being built in areas where they otherwise would be.55 When demand
2010 would have been roughly 25 percent lower.”); STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING
2019, supra note 3, at 12 (“To meet [robust demand for rental units and starter
homes], the supply of . . . housing will have to increase significantly.”).
49. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 1 (observing that
“additions to the housing stock have grown at an average annual rate of . . . 10
percent”).
50. Julia Falcon, Apartment Supply Exceeds Demand in Only 3 U.S. Markets,
HOUSINGWIRE (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/50205apartment-supply-exceeds-demand-in-only-3-us-markets/ [perma.cc/TJM2-H6DU].
51. While many, if not most, commentators and advocates agree that housing
supply is the greatest barrier to affordability, some do not. See generally Vicki Been,
Ingrid Gould & Katherine O’Regan, Supply Skepticism: Housing Supply and
Affordability, 29 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 25 (2019) (arguing that more housing will not
adequately address affordability challenges); Ron Feldman, The Affordable Housing
Shortage: Considering the Problem, Causes and Solutions (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis, Banking & Policy Working Paper No. 02-2, 2002) (concluding that a
shortage of income is largely behind the housing affordability problem).
52. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 2.
53. See, e.g., Mark Skidmore & Michael Peddle, Do Development Impact Fees
Reduce the Rate of Residential Development?, 29 GROWTH & CHANGE 383, 392–94
(1998) (finding that development fees in DuPage County, Illinois, reduced the rate
of residential construction by 25%).
54. Sarah Mawhorter & David Garcia, It All Adds Up: The Cost of Housing
Development Fees in Seven California Cities, TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS. INNOVATION
(Mar. 3, 2018), https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/blog/it-all-adds-up-the-cost-ofhousing-development-fees-in-seven-california-cities/ [perma.cc/7YJV-XGV9].
55. Building codes regulate the design and construction of buildings, which
creates compliance costs and discourages developers from building additional units.
David Listokin & David B. Hattis, Building Codes and Housing, 8 CITYSCAPE 21, 37
(2005). Zoning ordinances dictate how land in a particular jurisdiction can be used
and typically impose limits on building size, height, and bulk, which further
constrains rental housing supply. See Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko & Raven
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for housing is strong, the net effect of these obstacles is to raise land
and housing prices.56
However, this Note posits that another factor is also to blame
for rental housing unaffordability: the single-rate property tax. The
single-rate property tax is problematic because it is primarily a tax
on building values, and because buildings are among the most
expensive and durable capital goods that exist, a tax on building
values is usually large and long-lasting.57 Thus, the single-rate
property tax stands as a formidable obstacle to new housing
construction.58 Because lack of housing supply is one of the main
drivers of our current affordability crisis, a strong case can be made
for reforming the single-rate property tax system to one that is more
growth-friendly.59 Land value taxation, by simultaneously
rewarding landowners who develop their land and punishing those
who do not, represents such a reform. While land value taxation has
traditionally been praised for its ability to control the effects of
urban sprawl60 and combat urban blight,61 its ability to stimulate
development—and thus lead to a greater housing stock—indicates
that it may be able to reduce the pressures that demand is currently
exerting on rental housing prices. Many state and local legislatures
have debated enacting a land value tax; a few of them have even
Saks, Why Is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices,
48 J.L. & ECON. 331, 366 (2005) (finding that the substantial gap between the price
of housing and construction costs “suggests the power of land use controls in limiting
new construction”).
56. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 8.
57. Gaffney, supra note 24, at 75–76.
58. Id.
59. While the problems of the single-rate property tax could be solved by outright
repealing it, “[t]he loss in revenue . . . would have to be made up with other
taxes . . . or with massive cuts in government services.” Richard F. Dye & Richard
W. England, The Principles and Promises of Land Value Taxation, in LAND VALUE
TAXATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE 4 (Richard F. Dye & Richard W.
England eds., 2009) [hereinafter Dye & England, Principles and Promises]. Thus, the
case for reforming the single-rate property tax is stronger than the case for
eliminating it.
60. See, e.g., Seong-Hoon Cho, Seung Gyu Kim & Roland K. Roberts, Measuring
the Effects of a Land Value Tax on Land Development, 4 APPLIED SPATIAL ANALYSIS
& POL’Y 45, 47 (2011) (“A higher tax rate on land than on land improvements . . . is
a potential policy tool to moderate sprawl . . . .”); H. Spencer Banzhaf & Nathan
Lavery, Can the Land Tax Help Cure Urban Sprawl? Evidence from Growth Patterns
in Pennsylvania, 67 J. URB. ECON. 169, 177 (2010) (finding that “[a]dopting the splitrate tax results in a 4-5% point increase per decade in the growth of the density of
housing units for the first two decades”).
61. See Elaine S. Povich, Can Extra Taxes on Vacant Land Cure City Blight?,
PEW (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/state
line/2017/03/07/can-extra-taxes-on-vacant-land-cure-city-blight
[perma.cc/87N346HG] (discussing a push in Hartford, Connecticut, to assess higher taxes on unused
land so as to hasten development and reduce blight).
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done so.62 Nevertheless, most have rejected the idea, usually citing
concerns about its effectiveness and impact.63 However, as this Note
argues, a land value tax can be effective at encouraging more
housing development and thus reducing net housing costs, and
there are ways to mitigate its potentially adverse consequences.
Thus, state and local governments should consider using land value
taxation in their campaigns to make housing more affordable. 64
II. Land Value Taxation: History and Description65
The land value tax is a type of property tax. The property tax
is one of the oldest and most widely-used revenue sources in the
United States.66 For local governments, it is also one of the most
important, accounting for roughly half of local tax revenue. 67
Property taxes are assessed for real property and personal property,
but because real property is generally much more valuable than
personal property, it provides the basis for almost all of the revenue

62. Fairhope, Alabama; Arden, Delaware; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania are
among the cities that have enacted some variant of the land value tax. Steven C.
Bourassa, The U.S. Experience, in LAND VALUE TAXATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
PRACTICE, supra note 59, at 11–12. The City of Amsterdam, New York adopted land
value taxation in 1995, but repealed it the following year before its effect could be
observed. Id. at 12. Oregon, among other states, also briefly experimented with land
value taxation during the latter part of the twentieth century. See generally Richard
W. Lindholm & Roger C. Sturtevant, American Land Tax Roots: Plus
Experimentation in Oregon, in LAND VALUE TAXATION: THE PROGRESS AND POVERTY
CENTENARY 83–94 (Richard W. Lindholm & Arthur D. Lynn, Jr. eds., 1978)
(discussing the land value tax movement in Oregon).
63. See, e.g., Bourassa, supra note 62, at 16 (describing how an opponent to
Pittsburgh’s land value tax argued it “was confusing and was causing residential
neighborhoods to lose out at the expense of downtown interests”).
64. This Note’s discussion of land value taxation is confined to state and local
governments because most legal and economic scholars agree that the federal
government is constitutionally prohibited from assessing taxes on real property. See
Richard D. Coe, The Legal Framework in the United States, in LAND VALUE
TAXATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE, supra note 59, at 130 (noting that the
federal Constitution forbids Congress from laying direct taxes and that real property
taxes are generally assumed to be direct taxes within the meaning of the
Constitution). But see Steven B. Cord, Legal Suggestions for Enacting a Land Value
Tax 8–14 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper, 1999) (describing the various
ways by which the federal government could constitutionally assess a land value
tax).
65. For the purposes of this Note, I make no distinction between land value
taxation and split-rate variants of the real property tax that tax land at a much
higher rate than improvements.
66. Dye & England, Principles and Promises, supra note 59, at 3.
67. See MYRON ORFIELD, AMERICAN METROPOLITICS 88–89 (2002); see also
Bethany P. Paquin, Chronicle of the 161-Year History of State-Imposed Property Tax
Limitations 1 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Working Paper WP15BP1, 2015).
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derived from property taxes.68 For real property, most jurisdictions
use a single-rate property tax regime, under which land and
improvements to the land, such as buildings, are taxed at the same
rate.69 The operation of a single-rate property tax system can be
demonstrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose that a parcel
of land is valued at $10,000 and the sole improvement to that land—
a restaurant—is valued at $20,000. If the statutory property tax
rate is fixed at 5 percent, then the actual amount of property tax
owed under a single-rate property tax regime would be $1,500: $500
for the land and $1,000 for the restaurant. 70 Thus, as should be clear
from this hypothetical, the single-rate property tax “is actually two
types of taxes[:] one upon building values, and the other upon land
values.”71 Yet despite its reputation as a mainstay of local
government finance, the single-rate property tax has long faced
fierce public opposition.72
While people generally tend to dislike taxes, the single-rate
property tax has generated special controversy because it is
regressive73 and can fluctuate widely from year to year.74 There are
also relatively few ways to reduce the amount of property tax
owed.75 The opposition to the property tax has not been confined to
68. JOYCE ERRECART, ED GERRISH & SCOTT DRENKARD, TAX FOUND., STATES
MOVING AWAY FROM TAXES ON TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY 2 (2012). Not only is
real property generally more valuable than personal property, it also tends to
appreciate in value over time. In contrast, personal property, like cars and boats,
tends to lose value as it ages. This is another reason why personal property taxes
tend to make up a relatively small percentage of total local property tax revenue.
69. Dye & England, Principles and Promises, supra note 59, at 4 n.1.
70. This hypothetical assumes a taxable value of 100%. If a state were to instead
mandate that a 50% assessment ratio be applied to real property, then the amount
of property tax owed in this hypothetical would be $750: $250 for the land and $500
for the restaurant.
71. Alanna Hartzok, Pennsylvania’s Success with Local Property Tax Reform:
The Split Rate Tax, 56 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 205, 205 (1997) (emphasis added).
72. Ninety-five percent of voters on Debate.org voted in favor of abolishing the
single-rate property tax. Should Property Taxes Be Abolished?, DEBATE,
https://www.debate.org/opinions/should-property-taxes-be-abolished
[perma.cc/2YNN-5H6U]. Indeed, the public reaction to the tax has been so hostile
that forty-six states have enacted some form of legislation that limits local authority
to tax property. See Paquin, supra note 67, at 3. The most well-known (and most
influential) of these limitations is Proposition 13, the 1978 California taxpayer
initiative that capped property taxes at 1 percent. Id. at 8.
73. It is regressive because low-income individuals spend a greater percentage of
their income on housing than high-income individuals and thus are more heavily
impacted by real property taxes. CHARLES E. GILLILAND, PROPERTY TAXES: THE
GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY 1 (2013).
74. Id.
75. In most states, veterans, the elderly, disabled individuals, and owners of
designated residential homesteads can qualify for a partial exemption, but few
exemptions beyond those exist. Id. at 2.
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the public sphere either—economists have long decried the tax as
both inefficient and inequitable: inefficient because, by taxing use,
it discourages economic development; inequitable because it allows
landowners to profit from a resource that derives its value from
community rather than individual efforts.76 It was for these reasons
that Henry George, a nineteenth-century activist and political
economist, recommended that taxes on buildings be eliminated in
favor of a much higher single tax on the value of unimproved land. 77
Theoretically, this tax would have to be high enough to compensate
for the decrease in revenue caused by the elimination of the building
tax. Thus, in the restaurant hypothetical described above, under the
single tax regime envisioned by George, the amount of property tax
owed would still be $1,500, but it would be derived solely from the
value of the land. This concept, where land value is taxed at a
different, higher rate than building value, is known as land value
taxation. However, the modern interpretation of land value
taxation differs from the traditional single tax version proposed by
George, who believed that the single tax should be the only tax from
which governments would derive their property tax revenues. 78 In
76. See Dye & England, Principles and Promises, supra note 59, at 3–4.
77. See generally HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
CAUSE OF INDUSTRIAL DEPRESSIONS, AND OF INCREASE OF WANT WITH INCREASE OF
WEALTH: THE REMEDY (1879), available at https://tile.loc.gov/storageservices/service/gdc/gdcscd/00/03/70/63/30/7/00037063307/00037063307.pdf
[perma.cc/K2LY-PEP7]. While land value taxation is most famously associated with
Henry George, the origins of the theory can be found in the works of classical
economists John Stuart Mill and Adam Smith. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. V (Jonathan Riley ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1994) (1848)
(“[T]he existing land-tax . . . ought not to be regarded as a tax, but as a rent-charge
in favour of the public; a portion of the rent, reserved from the beginning by the
State, which has never belonged to or formed part of the income of the landlords, and
should not therefore be counted to them as part of their taxation.”); ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS bk. V (T. Nelson
& Sons ed., 1873) (1776) (“Ground-rents, so far as they exceed the ordinary rent of
land, are altogether owing to the good government of the sovereign,
which . . . enables them to pay so much more than its value for the ground which
they build their houses upon . . . Nothing can be more reasonable than that a fund,
which owes its existence to the good government of the state, should be taxed
peculiarly, or should contribute something more than the greater part of other funds,
towards the support of that government.”).
78. See GEORGE, supra note 77, at 371 (“Tax manufacturers, and the effect is to
check manufacturing; tax improvements, and the effect is to lessen improvement;
tax commerce, and the effect is to prevent exchange; tax capital, and the effect is to
drive it away. But the whole value of land may be taken in taxation, and the only
effect will be to stimulate industry, to open new opportunities to capital, and to
increase the production of wealth.”). While there are certain benefits to the single
tax, many scholars have not given the idea serious consideration because it is
unlikely that a state or local government, in the absence of other taxes, could raise

2021]

Ain't No Taxing High Enough

493

contrast, the modern interpretation of land value taxation does not
require the total elimination of taxes on building values—taxes on
building values are merely reduced, while taxes on land values are
increased.79 This approach to land value taxation is known as splitrate taxation and is the one that has been used by nearly all of the
jurisdictions that have experimented with land value taxation. 80
Yet because the single tax and the split-rate tax are each variants
of the land value tax, they both rest on the same theoretical
observations.
Two observations underlie land value tax theory. The first
observation is that all taxes, like taxes on income and sales,
generally operate to raise prices and discourage both production
and consumption.81 When a government assesses a tax on a good,
the cost of producing that good increases by the amount of the tax.82
Therefore, in order for suppliers to keep consumer purchases at pretax levels, the price of the good supplied must fall by the amount of
the tax.83 However, as a matter of theory and practice, this result
will not occur because at a lower price, suppliers will see their
profits decrease and will be unwilling to supply the good
demanded.84 Thus, because suppliers control the amount of the good
they are willing to supply, they will respond to taxes by passing
most of the cost of the tax onto consumers.85 In this way, taxes
operate to raise prices. Naturally, if the price of a good increases,
some consumers will purchase less of it.86 Accordingly, suppliers
land taxes high enough to continue funding government services at their present
level without violating the Constitution. See generally Eric Kades, Drawing the Line
Between Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens Principle, and Its Broader
Application, 97 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 189 (2002) (discussing how taxation may be
deemed an unconstitutional taking of private property if it unduly burdens
individual property interests).
79. See generally Vernon I. Saunders, In Defense of the Two-Rate Property Tax,
in LAND-VALUE TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC
FINANCE, supra note 24, at 269–76 (describing the use of land value taxation
throughout the twentieth century).
80. For example, all of the cities in Pennsylvania that had enacted a land value
tax continued to tax building values, albeit at a significantly lower rate than land
values. For a complete list of these cities and the rates imposed, see Dye & England,
Principles and Promises, supra note 59, at 15.
81. Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Simple Analytics of Land Value
Taxation, in LAND VALUE TAXATION: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE, supra note
59, at 58 [hereinafter Oates & Schwab, Simple Analytics]; see also GEORGE, supra
note 77, at 371.
82. See Oates & Schwab, Simple Analytics, supra note 81, at 56.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 58.
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will respond to lower consumer demand by producing less of the
good.87 Yet because these consumers were willing to purchase the
good at its previous price, and because the actual cost of producing
the good has not changed, it should be produced and consumed. 88
Thus, taxes generally lead to higher prices and, as a result, lower
levels of production and consumption. The same analysis applies to
taxes on building values, which have the effect of reducing
construction levels and raising rents. This is because buildings are
part of a firm’s production costs. Thus, unless the economic benefits
of improving a parcel of land outweigh the costs associated with an
increased tax burden, a landowner will only improve their land
until the point where it no longer becomes economically feasible—
where they can no longer raise rents high enough to pay the tax—
or decide not to build on the land at all, thereby avoiding the tax
altogether. Thus, the single-rate property tax—at least in part—
keeps the housing stock at less-than optimal levels by creating a
disincentive to build.
The second observation is that there are two fundamental
differences between land and other objects that render the first
observation inapplicable to land. First, whereas producers can
respond to high taxes by merely decreasing the amount of the goods
they produce, higher taxes cannot diminish the supply of land
because land is fixed in quantity.89 Therefore, although a tax on
land value would require landowners to pay more, “it gives them no
power to obtain more for the use of their land, as it in no way tends
to reduce the supply of land.”90 It is precisely this ability to reduce
supply that gives suppliers the power to pass taxes onto consumers
in the first place. However, because the supply of land cannot be
reduced, landowners cannot pass taxes on their land to tenants.
Second, land is immobile; unlike capital, it cannot be relocated to a
different jurisdiction to evade tax authorities.91 Thus, taxes on land
87. Id.
88. Economists use the term “deadweight loss” to describe this loss in economic
welfare. Id.
89. Although this statement is largely true, it is not completely true, as there are
a few instances where land has been “created.” For instance, “the Back Bay
neighborhood in Boston was created by filling the tidewater flats of the Charles River
over a 25-year period beginning in 1857.” Id. at 56 n.4. Likewise, much of the land
in the Streeterville neighborhood in Chicago was created through a combination of
landfilling and natural accretion. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill,
Contested Shore: Property Rights in Reclaimed Land and the Battle for Streeterville,
107 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2015).
90. GEORGE, supra note 77, at 373.
91. Arguably, this is true about buildings, too, but whereas buildings can be
reduced in size or demolished completely, land cannot.
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are unavoidable: every landowner would be required to register
their land and pay the tax on their land holdings. Together, these
two theoretical observations imply that the single-rate property tax
regime unduly burdens housing construction and that a switch to
land value taxation would free up more land for development and
put land to its best and highest possible use without harming
renters.
III. Using Land Value Taxation to Increase Affordability
A. How Land Value Taxation Can Create More Affordable
Rental Housing
Conventional property taxes discourage landowners from
improving their land by causing their taxes to rise.92 Because land
value taxation shifts most or all of the tax on improvements onto
land, landowners would be able to add more value to their land
without any or with insignificant tax increases, which reduces the
average tax rate on their property.93 In cities where demand is
strong, among the main reasons for the lack of affordable rental
housing is that there are not enough rental units available to
accommodate demand, not enough moderately-priced homes into
which renters can move, or some combination of the two.94 Thus,
switching to a land value tax system could help to spur development
in high-demand areas so as to increase the available rental housing
stock.
The incentive effects of land value taxation can be
demonstrated by the following hypothetical. Suppose that there are
two residential properties, each in a different part of the city. One
is a small, single-family house built on a large lot and located in a
high-valued neighborhood near the city’s central business district;
the other is a much larger multifamily rental housing unit built in
a neighborhood much further away from the city’s core where
properties are assessed at lower values. Suppose also that the land
and building values of the single-family house are each $200,000,
while the multifamily unit has land valued at $50,000 and
improvements valued at $350,000. Under a single-rate property tax
92. See discussion supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text; see also Arthur P.
Becker, Principles of Taxing Land and Buildings for Economic Development, in LAND
AND BUILDING TAXES 12 (1969).
93. Id. at 25; see also TAYLOR, supra note 48, at 13 (“Building more units on the
same plot of land allows a developer to spread land costs across more units, lessening
the impact of land costs on the cost of each unit. This is because land costs are fixed
and do not increase if a developer builds additional units.”).
94. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 11, 27.
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regime, both parties pay the same amount of tax, as both have a
total assessed value of $400,000. However, under a land value tax
regime, where the tax on building values is eliminated or
significantly reduced, that would no longer be the case. The tax
burdens of the two properties would not be equally shared. This is
because to receive a similar amount of tax revenue, the city would
have to increase the tax rate on land values to make up for the
reduced tax on building values.95 Thus, the multifamily unit
property would end up paying a lower share of total collections,
while the underused land in the higher-valued neighborhood would
see its tax share increase.
Not only does this result seem intuitively more fair, as lands—
in contrast to building values—are created by community efforts,
not individual ones, it also provides an economic incentive for
owners of higher-valued but vacant or underused land to develop
that land beyond its present use.96 It incentivizes development of
underused land by means of both stick (the tax on land value) and
carrot (the absence of tax on building values), rewarding both the
construction of new buildings and the renovation of old ones. Vacant
lots acquire new buildings, as owners either ramp up development
to meet a higher tax burden or sell to someone else who will improve
it. In the United States, on average, 17 percent of large cities’ land
area is considered to be vacant or underdeveloped,97 and many of
these cities have the highest rents and lowest vacancy rates.98 The
incentive effects of land value taxation would likely be most
powerful in these cities because land values tend to be the highest
in urban areas. 99 Thus, in the hypothetical described above, because
the tax on land values would increase under a land value tax
regime, the owner of the single-family property would have much
95. However, even if the city did not raise rates high enough to receive the same
amount in revenue, the land tax on the single-family property would still be much
higher than the land on the multifamily property, simply because the former is more
valuable than the latter.
96. Harold S. Buttenheim, Unwise Taxation as a Burden on Housing, 48 YALE
L.J. 240, 245 (1938).
97. Galen D. Newman, Ann O’M. Bowman, Ryan Jung Lee & Boah Kim, A
Current Inventory of Vacant Urban Land in America, 21 J. URB. DESIGN 302, 311
(2016).
98. A study conducted by PropertyShark and Yardi Matrix found that Dallas,
Las Vegas, Austin, San Antonio, Phoenix, Minneapolis, and Atlanta were among the
top ten cities in terms of the total vacant land area in their commercial business
districts. To view the results of this study, visit https://www.commercialcafe.com/
blog/study-development-vacant-land-major-us-cbd/ [perma.cc/7Y87-8796].
99. Buttenheim, supra note 96, at 241 (observing that “[w]here population
concentrates, the demand for land is greater than for equally advantageous sites
where population is sparse”).
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more of an incentive to redevelop the home as a duplex or other
multiple-family property, which would add more units to the city’s
rental housing stock.100
Land value taxation not only provides a powerful economic
incentive for landlords to build more housing; by reducing or
removing building taxes, it encourages greater intensity of land use,
and so is more favorable to apartment construction than
homebuilding.101 In contrast, single-rate property taxation tends to
favor larger parcels and thus discourages vertical construction. 102
This is because tall buildings are more costly to construct than short
buildings, which makes them more valuable for assessment
purposes.103 As developers build skywards, they encounter
increasing capital costs resulting in part from higher taxes. 104
Conversely, “horizontal spread enjoys decreasing capital
costs . . . and saves on capital by consuming more land.”105 This
forced demand for land in part explains the “sprawling” nature of
so many American cities.106 Accordingly, assessing a higher tax rate
on land values and reducing the rate on building values would cause
developers to substitute capital for land and thus would very likely
lead to more construction of rental housing.
Because of its depressing effects on land price, a switch to a
land value tax regime would also help to curb speculation in land
markets. Land speculation occurs when individuals buy or sell land
with the expectation of profiting from the transaction.107 Land
speculation not only raises land prices, but also removes land from
the market that could otherwise have been put to productive use. 108
100. Id.
101. Gaffney, supra note 24, at 89.
102. Id.
103. Construction of tall buildings is generally more expensive than construction
of short buildings “because of their need for sophisticated foundations, structural
systems to carry high wind loads, and high-tech mechanical, electrical, elevator, and
fire-resistant systems.” Mir M. Ali & Kheir Al-Kodmany, Tall Buildings and Urban
Habitat in the 21st Century: A Global Perspective, 2 BUILDINGS 384, 386 (2012).
104. Gaffney, supra note 24, at 76.
105. Id.
106. Id. (observing that “[i]n time[, building taxes] also lead[] to urban
expansion”). Another one of the main contributors to urban sprawl has been and
continues to be single-family zoning because of its general prohibition on vertical
development. See id.; see also Trickey, supra note 18.
107. Speculation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
108. Speculation in land was one of the main drivers of the U.S. housing price
boom between 2000 and 2006. Charles G. Nathanson & Eric Zwick, Arrested
Development: Theory and Evidence of Supply Speculation in the Housing Market, 73
J. FIN. 2587, 2623 (2018). For example, in Las Vegas, which has a relatively large
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The single-rate property tax system, by keeping landholding costs
relatively low, makes it economically feasible for speculators to buy
up land and await a rise in its value without making any
improvements. Under a land value tax regime, however,
speculation would be less possible. This is because shifting a larger
tax burden onto land would have the effect of lowering land prices
by making land less attractive as an investment vehicle—more
owners would sell land not to make a profit but to relieve
themselves of a tax liability. Therefore, because the use (as opposed
to the ownership) of land would primarily have economic value, the
costs to many owners of holding land in speculation would simply
become too onerous to justify continued ownership or
nondevelopment.109 In addition to its arresting effects on
construction, the single-rate property tax system makes rental
housing less affordable because it allows landlords to shift their
taxes onto their tenants, resulting in higher rents.110
However, under a land value tax regime, this shifting would
not occur because the land is fixed in supply.111 Landlords could not
raise the price of their land in response to a higher land tax because
at a higher price, less land would be demanded, which would result
in an excess supply of land and downward pressure on the cost of
land. Thus, a higher tax on land values is “borne entirely by
landowners” and therefore would not raise rents.112 On the
contrary, higher land taxes would lead to lower land prices, which
would cause rents to fall and thus would further aid in making
rental housing more affordable.113
Underlying the previous analysis are two assumptions about
landlord behavior: that land value taxation will effect the timing of

supply of undeveloped land, speculation in the land markets caused land prices to
quadruple between 2000 and 2006, rising from $150,000 per acre to roughly $700,000
per acre. Id. at 2590.
109. Harry G. Brown, Land Speculation and Land-Value Taxation, in LANDVALUE TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC FINANCE,
supra note 24, at 46, 56 (“[L]and-value taxation, resting equally on land whether
used or unused, must discourage [land speculation]”).
110. WALTER A. MORTON, HOUSING TAXATION 100 (1955) (finding that while
building taxes on owner-occupied property must be paid by the owner,
“[w]here . . . the property is occupied by a tenant, he may pay all or any part of a
higher house tax through higher rents”). However, in some states, like Minnesota,
certain tenants are able to claim a refund for all or at least a part of this amount.
See MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, PROPERTY TAX AS A PERCENTAGE OF RESIDENTIAL
RENT 1 (2005) (describing Minnesota’s Property Tax Refund Program).
111. See discussion supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
112. Oates & Schwab, Simple Analytics, supra note 81, at 57.
113. See id.
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landlords’ decisions to develop and that they will respond by
building residential, as opposed to mainly commercial, structures.
i.

More Landowners Will Improve Their Land

The first assumption is that land value taxation will affect the
timing of development, meaning that landlords will actually
respond to the tax by improving their land. While some
commentators are skeptical that this would be the case,114 empirical
evidence from Australia and the United States, while very limited,
does show that greater construction activity tends to follow when
higher land taxes are assessed. For example, in Australia, from
1921 to 1923, while only 7 percent of the municipalities in the state
of Victoria levied a tax only on land values, they were responsible
for nearly half of all new housing construction in that state,115 a
finding which is made all the more significant by the fact that only
16 percent of the state’s population lived in those areas.116 Likewise,
from 1921 to 1940, in South Australia, housing construction was
consistently more remarkable in the areas that used land value
taxation than in the areas that taxed land and building values at
equal rates.117 In general, across Australia, the states with a higher
number of municipalities using land value taxation generally had
higher residential building activity levels. In contrast, Tasmania,
where land value taxation was not practiced at all, had the
lowest.118 While additional factors, such as population growth, help
to explain these trends, the relationship between land value
taxation and building activity is significant and consistent enough
to suggest that the former was a central influence on the latter.
In comparison with Australia, the adoption of land value
taxation in the United States has been less widespread—almost all
of the experience with it has been in Pennsylvania and Hawaii—
and thus, the data on its effects are even more limited. 119
Nonetheless, the evidence indicates that the tax’s enactment in
114. See id. at 71.
115. Saunders, supra note 79, at 272. Moreover, “[f]rom 1954 to 1958, the 19
percent of municipalities that used [land value taxation] accounted for 62 percent of
new home construction” while the five municipalities that switched to land value
taxation in 1958 saw a 34 percent greater increase in construction over the next four
years than the nearby areas that continued to tax building values. Id.
116. E.J. Craigie, Australia, in LAND VALUE TAXATION AROUND THE WORLD 22
(Harry G. Brown ed., 1955).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Bourassa, supra note 62, at 11. Even though other states and cities have
experimented with land value taxation at varying points throughout time, little to
no data for them exists.
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those jurisdictions was generally followed by higher levels of
development. The most famous example of the land value tax in the
United States is the one adopted in 1913 by the City of Pittsburgh,
which was required by Pennsylvania law to assess a lower tax rate
on building values than on land values.120 After expanding its tax
on land values in 1979 to about five times the one on building
values, the City saw a 70 percent increase in annual building permit
values in the decade following the expansion.121 In contrast, permit
values in thirteen other major Rust Belt cities that did not assess a
land value tax (including Cincinnati, Detroit, and Buffalo) dropped
significantly during the same time period.122 Likewise, Oil City,
Pennsylvania saw a 58 percent increase in new construction activity
in the first three years after it adopted a land value tax compared
to the three years preceding the adoption. 123 Harrisburg, once
considered the most economically distressed city in the United
States, also benefited greatly from land value taxation: its total
number of vacant buildings decreased from over four thousand in
1982 to five hundred in 1994. 124 Stephen Reed, the mayor of
Harrisburg at the time, directly attributed its success to the City’s
adoption of the land value tax. 125 However, one of the primary
reasons for why these cities responded so favorably is because there
was high demand for improvements. In a few other Pennsylvania
cities, like Clairton, land value taxation failed to bring about new
development because the demand was simply absent.126 Without

120. Specifically, the law required all “second-class cities,” of which Pittsburgh
was one, to provide “for gradual increases in the land tax rate and gradual reductions
in the improvement tax rate over a period of 12 years.” Id. at 12.
121. Hartzok, supra note 71, at 208. Despite this documented success, support for
the tax began to wane after a property assessment in Allegheny County in 2001 led
to significant increases in land values and tax bills for resident taxpayers. Bourassa,
supra note 62, at 16. Even though these increases resulted from infrequent and
inaccurate assessments and substandard rate-setting procedures, it was the tax that
came under fire. Id. The nail in the coffin for Pittsburgh’s experimentation with land
value taxation came when Mayor Tom Murphy, who initially supported the tax and
was being challenged in the upcoming mayoral election, revised his position after it
became a high-profile political issue. Id. Nonetheless, despite the abolition of the
land value tax as a source of general revenue in Pittsburgh, the City still uses a landbased tax to finance the Downtown Pittsburgh Business Improvement District. Id.
122. Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Impact of Urban Land Taxation:
The Pittsburgh Experience, 50 NAT’L TAX J. 1, 9 (1997) [hereinafter Oates & Schwab,
Impact of Urban Land Taxation].
123. Saunders, supra note 79, at 272.
124. Hartzok, supra note 71, at 209–10.
125. Id. at 210 (quoting Mayor Reed, who stated that “[t]he two-rate system has
been and continues to be one of the key local policies that has been factored into this
initial economic success”).
126. Bourassa, supra note 62, at 23.
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demand to exert pressure on land values, taxes generally remained
low and thus gave landowners no real incentive to build or sell to
someone who would.127
Outside of Pennsylvania, the other major U.S. experience with
land value taxation occurred in 1963 when Hawaii adopted the tax
statewide.128 Following the enactment, the State saw a boom in
building activity similar to the ones that occurred in Pittsburgh, Oil
City, and Harrisburg.129 However, because the tax was primarily
adopted as part of a larger effort to promote tourism, this boom was
mostly in hotel building, not residential construction. 130 Ultimately,
local backlash against the new, taller construction and its rapid,
urban transformation of Hawaii’s Waikiki Beach led the state
legislature to rescind the law that created the tax, 131 even though
poor zoning and planning decisions were arguably more responsible
for the character change than land value taxation per se.132 Yet, in
many ways, this backlash was a testament to land value taxation’s
success at encouraging development, not its failure.
ii. More Residential Structures Will Be Built
The other assumption underlying this analysis is that owners
of vacant or underdeveloped land would generally respond to higher
land taxes by building more residential structures than commercial
structures. Of course, this does not necessarily have to be the case.
Unlike zoning ordinances and building codes, real estate taxes
cannot require or prohibit specific land uses, but can only provide
economic incentives. Indeed, the Pittsburgh construction boom was
largely in commercial building activity; there was only a slight
increase in residential construction.133 Likewise, as was previously
mentioned, most of the new development in Hawaii came from the
hotel building sector.134

127. Cf. Oates & Schwab, Simple Analytics, supra note 81, at 56 (supplying the
economic analysis).
128. Bourassa, supra note 62, at 14.
129. Id. at 17.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 17–20. In fact, singer/songwriter Joni Mitchell reportedly wrote her
famous lyric “they paved paradise and put up a parking lot” while visiting Waikiki
in 1972. Id. at 17.
132. RICHARD F. DYE & RICHARD W. ENGLAND, LINCOLN I NST. OF LAND POL’Y,
ASSESSING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LAND VALUE TAXATION 14 (2010).
133. Oates & Schwab, Impact of Urban Land Taxation, supra note 122, at 8–9.
However, at the time, the national housing market was in a building slump, so even
a slight increase in residential construction is worth noting. Id.
134. Bourassa, supra note 62, at 17.
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Yet there are three reasons why it is safe to make this
assumption. One reason is that most, if not all, of the jurisdictions
discussed in this section adopted or used land value taxation with a
specific goal in mind—either to promote tourism, revitalize a
downtown business district, or spur economic development
generally—and, in almost every case, the tax successfully achieved
that goal.135 Thus, if a government adopted land value taxation
intending to increase rental housing production, it stands to reason
that it could achieve that goal by assessing the tax in a way that
favors dense residential building.136 A second reason is that rental
units are income-producing properties and so would naturally be
attractive development options for landowners seeking to offset
their increased tax burdens. The third reason is that municipal
zoning ordinances often prohibit commercial building in residential
zones, so owners of vacant or underdeveloped lots zoned for
residential use would be compelled to construct residential
structures. Some of these structures would undoubtedly be
multifamily units.137 In sum, it seems likely that cities would see an
increase in the number of rental units by switching to a land value
tax regime, which would reduce the pressures of demand on supply
and thus lead to more affordable housing for low- and middleincome renters.
B. Consequences of Adopting Land Value Taxation and How
to Mitigate Them
While land value taxation can be used to positively impact the
lives of renters nationwide, there are three groups that the tax may
negatively impact: homeowners, manufactured home residents, and
independent (“family”) farmers. These groups stand to be harmed
because they either own large tracts of underdeveloped land, as is
usually the case with homeowners and independent farmers, or rent
the land upon which they live from landlords who would be
incentivized under a land value tax regime to convert the land to a
different use, as is usually the case with manufactured home
135. See generally id. at 11–25 (comparing land value taxes in Pennsylvania and
Hawaii).
136. For example, landowners could have their land tax rates reduced so long as
they developed and operated a multifamily housing complex on the parcel burdened
by the tax. However, should the complex be demolished or converted to a use other
than multifamily, the rate would be adjusted back to its original level. In this way,
the land value tax would encourage development of land generally, but housing
development specifically.
137. Of course, this could not happen on lots zoned for single-family use, which
indicates why zoning reform is necessary to create more affordable housing.
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residents. The impacts on these groups, to the extent that they will
occur at all under a land value tax system, can and should be
mitigated or, if possible, avoided altogether.
i. Homeowners
Because land value taxation incentivizes greater intensity of
land use, it naturally favors multifamily housing over single-family
housing and thus benefits renters rather than homeowners. 138
However, even though homeowners, on average, tend to be
wealthier than renters and are thus less likely to face affordability
challenges,139 it remains the case that many homeowners are costburdened.140 Insofar as the purpose of enacting a land value tax is
to create more affordable housing generally, it would be
counterproductive for housing to become less affordable as a result
of adopting the tax. Nonetheless, a switch to a land value tax regime
would likely not unduly burden homeowners for two reasons. First,
land taxes increase with land values, and single-family properties
are typically—although not always—located in less urban, lowervalue areas.141 Therefore, single-family properties would likely face
lower land taxes than buildings located in more urban, higher-value
areas. Second, because higher taxes on land values would be
accompanied by lower taxes on building values, most single-family
homeowners would likely see their actual property tax payment
either decrease, remain the same, or increase by a negligible
amount.142 Thus, land value taxation, while certainly more
138. See discussion supra notes 101–106 and accompanying text.
139. In 2016, the median net worth of a homeowner was $231,400, whereas the
median net worth of a renter or non-homeowner was $5,200. Jesse Bricker, Lisa J.
Dettling, Alice Henriques, Joanne W. Hsu, Lindsay Jacobs, Kevin B. Moore, Sarah
Pack, John Sabelhaus, Jeffrey Thompson & Richard A. Windle, Changes in U.S.
Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances,
103 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 13 (2017).
140. STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2019, supra note 3, at 31.
141. See Emily Badger & Quoctrung Bui, Cities Start to Question an American
Ideal: A House With a Yard on Every Lot, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (June 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/18/upshot/cities-across-americaquestion-single-family-zoning.html [perma.cc/2EVH-N6C7] (discussing how,
compared to urban communities, in suburban communities “a higher share of land
is devoted to housing, and a higher share of that housing is required to be singlefamily”). This is because land is usually cheaper at the edge of every city, and so that
is where people tend to own homes. See R. Pendall, Do Land-Use Controls Cause
Sprawl?, 26 ENV’T & PLAN. B 555, 556 (1999) (discussing land value in suburban
areas and observing the general principle that “more sprawl occurs where land
values are lower”).
142. Ultimately, however, the actual amount of property tax paid by homeowners
under a land value tax regime will depend on their land intensity, which is the land
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favorable to apartment-building, does not necessarily make
homeowning more costly.
However, while it is unlikely that very many homeowners will
be negatively affected by a switch to land value taxation, one group
of homeowners deserves special consideration: those who are assetrich but cash-poor.143 These individuals tend to be those who
purchased a home long ago for a low price and saw that home’s
value greatly appreciate over the following years.144 Still, their
wages failed to appreciate at the same rate, leaving them with
considerable housing wealth but little to no liquid assets.145 Even
though these types of homeowners are arguably not presently costburdened, they may become cost-burdened under a land value tax
system if the increase to their property tax payment is more than
they are presently able to pay.146 One way to avoid this issue is to
grandfather these individuals into their previous property tax
payments until death or the property is sold.147 Another way is to
introduce land value taxation with a lower split rate that gradually
increases over a period of time.148 Lastly, just like how many
jurisdictions allow veterans, senior citizens, and disabled
individuals to defer all or part of their property tax payments,149 a
deferral category could be created for those who are unable to pay
their property tax because of undue burden. 150 Thus, while land
value taxation does have the potential to harm these types of
homeowners, this harm is not inevitable and can be mitigated or
eliminated.

value divided by the total value (land value plus building value). What this generally
means is that less intensely developed parcels are more likely to see a tax increase,
while the opposite is true for more intensely developed lots. For a study of how
different classes of homeowners would be impacted under a land value tax regime,
see DYE & ENGLAND, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, supra note 132, at 28–30.
143. PETER HULSEMAN, ADAM ROVANG, DEVIN BALES & HOANG THE NGUYEN, NW.
ECON. RES. CTR., LAND VALUE TAX ANALYSIS: SIMULATING THE TAX IN MULTNOMAH
COUNTY 28 (2019).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 28–29.
148. Id. at 29. For example, instead of assessing a 70/30 or 90/10 land-to-building
value ratio, the first year of implementation could begin with a 55/45 or 60/40 landto-building value ratio. This rate would then slowly increase over the following years,
which would ease the harshness of the impact on these types of homeowners.
149. See GILLILAND, supra note 73, at 2.
150. HULSEMAN ET AL., supra note 143, at 29.
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ii. Manufactured Home Residents
Manufactured home residents may either be burdened or
benefited under a land value tax system depending on whether their
home is assessed as real or personal property. While states
generally differ in how they classify manufactured homes,151 most
states treat manufactured homes as personal property for
assessment purposes unless the resident owns the land on which
the home is situated.152 Because the vast majority of manufactured
home residents own the land upon which their home is located, 153
they likely pay both building and land taxes, and thus would be
affected by a land value tax system in the same way that owners of
site-built homes would be affected.154 In contrast, roughly onefourth of manufactured home residents do not own the land on
which their home is situated,155 so a land value tax system would
largely affect them in the same way that it would affect renters
generally.156 However, an essential difference between multifamily
housing and manufactured housing is that multifamily housing is a
relatively intensive land use, while manufactured housing is not.
For manufactured home residents who rent rather than own their
land, this distinction makes little difference as far as rental rates
are concerned, because landlords cannot pass higher land taxes onto
their tenants.157 Still, the distinction does make a difference in a
151. Burkhart, supra note 34, at 442–45.
152. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 320.015 (2020) (“A mobile home is to be considered real
property only when the owner of the mobile home is also the owner of the land on
which the mobile home is situated and said mobile home is permanently affixed
thereto.”); WIS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, PROPERTY TAX GUIDE FOR MANUFACTURED AND
MOBILE HOME OWNERS 6 (2020) (stating that a manufactured home can only be
considered personal property if it is situated on land owned by someone other than
the homeowner). But see IDAHO CODE § 63-303 (2016) (“Manufactured homes shall
be assessed as other residential housing . . . .”).
153. See Julia O. Beamish, Rosemary C. Goss, Jorge H. Atiles & Youngjoo Kim,
Not a Trailer Anymore: Perceptions of Manufactured Housing, 12 HOUS. POL’Y
DEBATE 373, 381 (2001) (finding that 93% of double-section and 73% of single-section
manufactured home residents owned the land on which their home was located). One
reason for why this finding may be surprising is that manufactured home residents
have long been thought of as predominantly low-income when they actually
encompass a range of income groups. See Burkhart, supra note 34, at 435 (describing
the misperceptions about manufactured home residents).
154. See discussion supra note 142 and accompanying text (observing singlefamily homeowners would likely see their actual property tax payment either
decrease, remain the same, or increase by a negligible amount).
155. Beamish et al., supra note 153, at 381.
156. See discussion supra notes 110–111 and accompanying text (noting under a
land value regime, landlords will be less likely to shift their taxes onto their tenants
through charging higher rents).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 111–113; Oates & Schwab, Simple
Analytics, supra note 81, at 57.
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landlord’s decision about whether to let their land continue in its
current use or redevelop it for a more intensive use. What this
means is that, under a land value tax regime, a landlord is more
likely to redevelop their land when a manufactured home resident
is renting it than when it is already being used to provide site-built
multifamily rental housing. However, governments can avoid this
undesirable outcome by completely exempting land that is being
rented for manufactured home use from the increased land tax.
Exempting land should not be problematic because manufactured
homes located on leased land are typically assessed as personal
property and thus are not charged a building tax. Therefore,
governments would not lose revenue by exempting these types of
homes from the higher land tax; they would simply not gain more
revenue.
iii. Independent Farmers
Because land value taxation disfavors low-density
development,158 independent farmers stand to be hit the hardest by
a land value tax system, as farms typically encompass many acres
of unimproved land. Yet “[f]arms provide value without full
development”159 and so even though it is the intention of land value
taxation to encourage landowners to free up unused or underused
land for development, it would generally be unwise to create a
system that makes farm operation impossible, inefficient, or at the
very least, highly difficult.160 Therefore, in order to avoid the
hardship that farmers could theoretically face under a land value
tax system, farms could be excluded from the system entirely and
instead taxed at whatever rate was assessed under the previous
system.161 Alternatively, farms could be “given a current use
158. See discussion supra notes 101–106 and accompanying text.
159. HULSEMAN ET AL., supra note 143, at 28.
160. But see Alanna Hartzok, Pennsylvania Farmers and the Split-Rate Tax, in
LAND-VALUE TAXATION: THE EQUITABLE AND EFFICIENT SOURCE OF PUBLIC
FINANCE, supra note 24, at 264 (arguing that “farm owners with larger amounts of
land value pay disproportionately less in taxes [under a single-rate property tax
regime] than those with less valuable holdings” and that “[o]vertaxing buildings and
undertaxing land favor large farming operations that are not necessarily the most
efficient.”).
161. HULSEMAN ET AL., supra note 143, at 28. It is worth noting here that the net
worth of farm households tends to be much higher on average than that of non-farm
households. See ASHOK K. MISHRA, HISHAM S. EL-OSTA, MITCHELL J. MOREHART,
JAMES D. JOHNSON & JEFFREY W. HOPKINS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., INCOME, WEALTH,
AND THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF FARM HOUSEHOLDS 14 (2002) (finding that the
total net worth of an average farm household in 1999 was $563,562). Thus, whether
most farmers would actually become cost-burdened under a land value tax regime is
debatable.
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exemption that allows them to continue to operate without undue
tax burden.”162 Ultimately, however, because farms tend to be
located in rural areas where land is not highly valued, there is
reason to believe that many farms, and specifically those with
proportionately higher building-to-land ratios, would not be
drastically affected by a land value tax—or even affected at all.163
Conclusion
As America’s affordable housing crisis has worsened, local
governments have begun to look inwards and reform some of the
very laws and policies responsible for leading us here. 164 Yet the
single-rate property tax regime, which has contributed significantly
to that crisis by restricting rental housing supplies, has so far gone
undetected and thus has managed to avoid the same fate as singlefamily zoning.165 Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that
land value taxation is an effective tool for freeing up land for
development and creating more units for the renters who seek
them. Thus, switching to a land value taxation is the next step that
local governments should take to combat the nation’s growing
affordable rental housing crisis.

162.
163.
164.
165.

HULSEMAN ET AL., supra note 143, at 28.
Hartzok, supra note 160, at 265.
See discussion supra notes 16–22 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Trickey, supra note 18.

